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Summary 
As the EU increasingly manifests its Common Security and Defence Policy 
by conducting military operations in third countries with troops put at its 
disposal from EU member states and non-member states, questions emerge 
with regards to the legal framework and the applicable law governing the 
conduct of EU military operations. This paper address how the legal 
framework, with focus on international humanitarian law, can apply to EU 
military operations.  
 
The EU has a substantial legal framework for its military operations which 
includes the capability to launch a wide range of different military 
operations. Practice of commenced operations has illustrated that a EU 
military operation one day might become engaged in an armed conflict. The 
EU has international legal personality opposed of its member states and 
possesses rights and obligations under international humanitarian law (IHL). 
The EU does not explicitly include IHL in its own legal order. However, it 
could be argued that the Treaty of Lisbon indirectly, especially by way of 
human rights law, contains obligations for the EU to respect IHL.  
 
The IHL-treaty realm excludes ratification by the EU. However, the EU is 
bound by customary IHL when it undertakes activities in the field in which 
IHL is relevant. The EU could in principle be considered as a party to an 
armed conflict, but it is uncertain if it is the EU or its member states (and 
third states) that should be regarded as a party, in the event of an armed 
conflict.  
 
The rapid development of EU military operations makes it essential to 
clarify, and to regulate, the EU´s conduct as a military actor under IHL. The 
EU could be considered to exercise a significant degree of command and/or 
control over a EU military operation. It is recommended that the EU clarify 
the division of command and control between itself and the participating 
states in military operations. By doing this, the EU would also provide 
clarification with regard to the question of responsibility. For the benefit of 
a clear legal framework for the troops on the ground, the EU is 
recommended to regulate the conduct of its military operations under IHL. 
This would demonstrate that the EU accepts that its conduct as a military 
actor with international legal personality creates an obligation for it to act in 
a liable manner and by that, the EU could potentially contribute to develop 
the legal regime of IHL.  
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Sammanfattning 
Denna uppsats behandlar frågan om hur det rättsliga ramverket för EUs 
militära operationer, med fokus på internationell humanitär rätt, kan 
tillämpas. Givet att EU snabbt utvecklat en militär kapacitet inom sin 
gemensamma säkerhets- och försvarspolitik genom verkställande av militära 
operationer utförda av EU medlemsstater och icke medlemsstater i tredje 
land, uppstår frågor om tillämplig lag och det rättsliga ramverk som reglerar 
utförandet av militära operationer.  
 
Det rättsliga ramverket för EUs militära operationer är omfattande och ger 
EU möjlighet att utföra ett brett spektrum av olika militära operationer. 
Möjligheten att en EU militär operation en dag blir bli inblandade i en 
väpnad konflikt kan inte ignoreras. EU är en internationell juridisk person 
och har således rättigheter och skyldigheter enligt internationell humanitär 
rätt (IHL). EUs egna rättsordning omfattar inte en uttrycklig hänvisning till 
internationell humanitär rätt. Lissabonfördraget kan dock, framförallt genom 
en vid tolkning av EUs lagstadgade mänskliga rättigheter, indirekt anses 
innehålla en skyldighet för EU att respektera internationell humanitär rätt.  
 
Rådande IHL-konventioner tillåter inte en ratificering av EU. Däremot kan 
EU konstateras vara bundet av IHL genom internationell sedvanerätt när EU 
genomför aktiviteter inom områden där IHL är relevant. EU kan i princip 
betraktas som en part till en väpnad konflikt, men det är osäkert om det är 
EU eller de deltagande länderna i en EU militär operation, som kommer att 
betraktas som part i händelse av en väpnad konflikt. 
 
Den snabba utvecklingen av EUs militära operationer gör det nödvändigt att 
klargöra, och att reglera, EUs agerande som militär aktör under 
internationell humanitär rätt. I princip kan EU anses utöva en betydande 
grad av befäl och kontroll över EU militära operationer men rättsläget är 
osäkert varför EU rekommenderas att klargöra fördelningen av kontroll 
mellan EU och de deltagande staterna. Därigenom skulle EU också bidra till 
ett förtydligande i frågan om ansvarsfördelning. EU uppmanas att reglera 
genomförandet av sina militära operationer under internationell humanitär 
rätt, detta skulle underlätta för EU-trupper i fält och samtidigt visa att EU 
accepterar att dess agerande som en militär aktör och internationell juridisk 
person genererar en skyldighet för EU att agera på ett vederhäftigt sätt. 
Genom detta kan EU potentiellt bidra till att utveckla den internationella 
humanitära rätten.   
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Abbreviations 
CIVCOM Committee for Civilian Aspects of 
 Crisis Management 
CONOPS Concept of Operation 
COREPER Committee of Permanent
 Representation 
Council European Council  
CSDP Common Security and Defence
 Policy 
ECHR European Convention for the
 Protection of Human Rights and
 Fundamental Freedoms   
ECJ The European Court of Justice  
ECtHR The European Court of Human
 Rights 
EDA European Defence Agency  
EEAS European External Actions Service 
ESDP European Security and Defence
 Policy 
EUMC European Union Military
 Committee 
EUMCWG European Union Military
 Committee Working Group 
EU European Union 
IHL International Humanitarian Law 
HTF Headline Task Force  
NATO North Atlantic Treaty 
 Organization 
OJ Official Journal  
OPLAN Operation Plan 
PMG Politico-Military Group 
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PSC Political and Security Committee 
ROE Rules of Engagement  
SC Security Council 
SOFA Status of Forces Agreement 
TEU Treaty on the European Union 
TFEU Treaty on the Function of the 
 European Union  
UN United Nations 
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1  Introduction  
Since 2003 the European Union (EU) has been engaged in 27 civilian and 
military crisis management operations, thus rapidly increasing its capability 
and importance as a global security actor. As a result of the acquired and 
developed operational military capability over the course of the last decade 
the EU can now be considered a military actor1, similar to the United 
Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).   
 
The first EU military operation was operation CONCORDIA deployed in 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2003. Since then the EU has 
launched an additional seven military operations, the most recent being 
EUTM Mali in February 2013. Apart from EUTM Mali the EU is currently 
conducting four other military operations, the peacekeeping operation 
EUFOR ALTHEA launched in Bosnia – Herzegovina in 2004, operation 
EUNAVFOR Atalanta launched in 2008 at the sea coast of Somalia and 
EUTM Somalia launched in Somalia in 2010.  
 
Practice of the commenced operations illustrates that EU military operations 
are performed in an increasingly complex, hostile and uncertain security 
environment. For example operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta has expanded in 
size and level of difficulty. In operation ARTEMIS EU-led forces were 
under attack and as they returned the fire, they killed two attackers. In 
EUFOR Tchad/RCA the environment for the operation was challenging 
with several on-going armed conflicts. 
  
To date, no EU military operation has engaged in armed conflict. However, 
due to the EU´s increasing engagement in military operations, its focus on 
maintaining international peace and security, and the practice of conducted 
and launched operations, it is no longer premature to argue that EU-led 
forces may at some point become engaged in a conflict situation in which 
international humanitarian law (IHL) subsequently could apply. EU military 
operations are conducted in a third state by troops voluntarily placed at the 
disposal of the EU by member states and non-member states (third states), 
consequently aspects of international law become applicable in addition to 
EU law. Accordingly, the conduct of EU military operations fosters 
questions with regards to the legal framework governing an operation and 
the law applicable to the EU and its military forces.  
                                                
1 See further in Chapter 2, p. 14.  
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1.1  Purpose and research question  
An examination of the legal framework governing EU military operations is 
crucial for an understanding of the EU´s activities within its Common 
Security and Defence Policy. Due to the EU´s increasing engagement in 
military operations and the fact that operations take place in complex and 
uncertain security areas, an exploration of the EU as a military actor and an 
assessment of the applicability of IHL in EU military operations is crucial. 
The peculiarity of the EU as an international organisation raises various 
questions with regards to the relationship between the EU and IHL, and the 
potential application of IHL obligations in EU military operations.  
 
Accordingly, the author aims to initially explore the new acquired role of 
the EU as a military actor and the legal framework applicable to EU military 
operations. Thereafter the author aims to emphasize the relationship 
between the EU and IHL, and assess if and how, EU military operations can 
be bound by IHL obligations. In other words the research question is:  
 
• How can the legal framework with focus on international 
humanitarian law apply to EU military operations?  
 
1.2  Theory and method  
What is the EU? As the EU stands today it contains both supranational and 
intergovernmental elements, hence it is not possible to define the EU as 
either a supranational entity or an intergovernmental organisation. Perhaps 
the EU is a mixture of both. Therefore the theory in this thesis is based on 
the assumption that it is uncertain what the EU de facto is. The unique and 
unclear nature of the EU is the point of departure for the examination of 
how the legal framework with focus on IHL can apply to EU military 
operations. The outset of the thesis is that law should govern military 
operations. Irrespective of the organisation involved, international 
humanitarian law must apply in all military operations encompassing an 
armed conflict.  
 
The methodology applied by the author is based on traditional legal 
dogmatic approach, meaning that the author describes applicable law and 
regulations whilst different kind of sources of laws are recited and explained 
through preliminary work and other relevant sources. It is important to point 
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out that the thesis does not comprise a description of every feature or 
regulation in this area. Moreover, the topic and the scope of the thesis relate 
to a relatively new area, which have not been thoroughly examined by 
scholars why the legal work on this area is limited. Within the existing 
material the author has selected the material best suitable for the purpose of 
the thesis.  
 
The law applicable to EU military operations can be divided into the internal 
legal framework (EU law) and the external legal framework (international 
law and to the extent agreed, the national law of the host country). 
International law applicable to EU military operations could hypothetically 
derive both from the internal and the external legal framework, since it, to a 
certain extent, could be understood as a part of EU law but at the same time 
maintain its distinct existence. 
 
The basic of the thesis is primarily the Treaty of the European Union.2 The 
author will examine primary and secondary sources of EU legislation. 
Official documents issued by EU institutions, mainly European Council 
decisions, will play a crucial role in the material of the thesis. The main 
international humanitarian law instruments, especially customary IHL and 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols, 
complement this material. The author has attempted to include practice of 
EU military operations and to a certain extent reconcile practice aspects 
with the theoretical legal framework. The examination also finds its sources 
in jurisprudence and literature, such as articles, essays, working papers and 
EU guidelines. Internet sources, mainly deriving from the EU, are used 
since they can provide a practical perspective to the examination. It is 
important to note that some of the sources, mainly the EU planning 
documents, are classified and normally not in the public domain, wherefore 
the content cannot be examined by the author.   
1.3  Thesis outline   
For the purpose of a clear understanding and structure, the author has 
chosen to end every chapter with a section of conclusions whilst the final 
chapter contains concluding remarks. By way of introduction chapter two is 
devoted to the EU´s role as a new military actor and to enlighten the 
military operations undertaken by the EU so far. Chapter three examine the 
legal framework applicable to EU military operations, including the legal 
                                                
2 As amended by the Lisbon Treaty.  
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basis as it derives both from EU law and international law, the planning and 
decision-making process, the command and control and a short description 
of the applicability of human rights law. Chapter four analyses the 
relationship between the EU and international humanitarian law and in this 
regard different aspects of the applicability of IHL to EU military operations 
are examined. Chapter five assesses the role of international humanitarian 
law in the EU´s internal legal order, using the EU Treaty, the legal basis for 
EU military operations and EU soft law instruments. The final chapter 
contains concluding remarks and recommendations for the future. 
1.4  Limitations  
The thesis is limited to a description of the basic rules. The legal framework 
of EU military operations is very complex, especially with regards to the 
law applicable to the conduct of military operations which is a complex 
combination of EU law, domestic law (the law of the sending States and the 
host State) and international law. It is not the aim of the author to examine 
all international law questions relating to a military operation. Quite the 
opposite, as the focus of the thesis is on international humanitarian law, 
other aspects of international law are not examined. However, human rights 
law will be given attention in order to illustrate its existence and the extent 
that it could potentially work as a legal link for the integration of IHL into 
the EU´s legal order. 
 
Another related aspect of the legal framework of EU military operations is 
the relationship between the EU and NATO, this is not a focus and only 
mentioned upon its existence. The scope of the thesis is limited to military 
operations as a part of the EU´s crisis management why civilian missions 
are not studied. Neither are the questions about financing or criminal law 
examined.  
 
The aim of the thesis is to examine the relationship between the EU as an 
international organisation and the potential applicability of IHL in EU 
military operations. This excludes examining other features of IHL, e.g. the 
definition and threshold of an armed conflict, the question of international 
or non-international armed conflict, question of occupation and impact of 
UN Security Council intervention.  
 
As part of the examination of the relationship between the EU and IHL, the 
question of responsibility of wrongful acts under IHL is highlighted. 
However this question relates to other fields of international law, e.g. 
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international institutional law, the law of responsibility of states, the law of 
responsibility of international organisations and IHL. Consequently an 
extensive examination of this question is too wide for the scope of this 
paper.  
 
Instead of regional organisation the author has chosen to use the definition 
international organisation (created on the basis of a treaty by states and 
encompassing international legal personality separated from its members 
states) when referring to the EU as an organisation performing military 
operations outside the EU territory.  
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2   The EU as a new military 
actor 
A part of what makes the EU unique as an organisation is that it contains 
supranational cooperation, although at the same time operating on an 
intergovernmental basis. Evidently making the status of the EU unclear but 
thus unique.  
 
The EU acquires a sui generis (unique in characteristics) nature as an 
international organisation.3 The EU possesses peculiarities contrary to other 
organisations, e.g. the EU has an own currency, a concept of citizenship, 
jurisdiction over a given territory and an own defence policy with the 
capability to lead to a common defence.4 Moreover the EU´s treaty 
foundation has a constitutional nature and is additionally formed as 
internationally agreements, making the way for a new international legal 
system.5 
 
The unique, and unclear, nature of the EU is the point of departure for the 
continued examination of how the legal framework with focus on IHL can 
apply to EU military operations. By a way of introduction for the 
examination in the following chapters this chapter presents the new acquired 
role for the EU in the field of security and defence issues and how the EU in 
practice has developed into a military actor.   
 
The scene of crisis management have long been dominated by the UN and 
NATO, thus legal scholars have mainly focused on these organisations 
when examined the military conduct of multilateral peacekeeping forces. 
However, the operational framework of the EU´s security and defence 
policy has gone through a crucial development during the last decade and 
the responsibility of the EU in maintaining international peace and security 
has increased rapidly.6   
  
                                                
3 Zwanenburg, Marten. The duty to respect International Humanitarian Law during 
European Union-led operations, 2012, p. 66.    
4 Falco, Valentina. Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law in the Common 
Security and Defence Policy: Legal Framework and Perspectives for PMSC Regulations, 
2009, p. 12. 
5 Falco, Valentina. The Internal Legal Order of the European Union as a Complementary 
Framework for its Obligations under IHL, 2009, p.189. 
6 Ibid., p. 172.  
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The starting point for the EU´s role as a military actor arose in 1992 in the 
Treaty of Maastricht that referred to “the eventual framing of a common 
defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence policy”.7 
Following the outcome of the 1998 British-French Summit of Saint-Malo,8 
the President of the European Commission and the heads of the member 
states of the EU stated at the 1999 Cologne European Council inter alia “the 
Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible 
military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in 
order to respond to international crises”9. Subsequently the EU´s Security 
and Defence Policy (ESDP) came into force in 1999 as a part of the EU´s 
Common Foreign and Security Policy.10 The ESDP became operational in 
2003 when the General Affairs and the External Relations Council stated 
“the EU now has operational capability across the full range of the 
Petersberg tasks".11 The entry into force of the Treaty of Nice gave the legal 
basis for the EU´s involvement in military operations by virtue of Art. 17 
that declared, “the common foreign and security policy shall include all 
questions relating to the security of the Union. The questions referred to 
shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks and task of combat forces in 
crisis management, including peacemaking”.12 Art. 17 contained the so-
called “Petersberg Tasks”.13 
 
Succeeding Council meetings of the 1999 European Council of Cologne 
resulted in the founding of a permanent military structures within the 
European Council, for example the Political and Security Committee14, the 
                                                
7 Treaty on the European Union, Treaty of Maastricht of 29 July 1992, Article J.4 (1), O.J. 
(C 191/1).  
8 Joint Declaration issued at the British-France Summit, Saint Malo France, 3-4 December 
1998. Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/French-
British%20Summit%20Declaration,%20Saint-Malo,%201998%20-%20EN.pdf 
9 Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council, 3 and 4 June 1999. Available in 
Annex III p.33: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Cologne%20European%20Council-
Presidency%20conclusions.pdf. 
10 Zwanenburg, Marten. Toward a more mature ESDP: Responsibility for violations of 
international humanitarian law by EU crisis management operations, 2008, p. 395. 
11 Declaration on EU military capabilities, 19-20. V. 2003. 9379/03 (Presse 138) p. 2. 
Available at: 
http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Declaration%20on%20EU%20Military%20
Capabilities%20-%20May%202003.pdf. 
12 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, of 29 December 2006, article 17, 
O.J. (C 321/5). 
13 The Petersberg Tasks were set out in the Petersbergs Declaration adopted at the 
Ministerial Council of the Western European Union in June 1992; Petersbergs Declaration 
of the Western European Union Council of Ministers, para. II.4, June 19, 1992. Available 
at: http://www.weu.int/documents/920619peten.pdf.  
14 Council Decision 2001/78/CFSP of 22 January 2001 setting up the Political and Security 
Committee, 2001 O.J. (L 27/1).  
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EU Military Committee15 and the EU Military Staff16. In the year of 2004 
the European Defence Agency17 was set up and 2007 a EU Operation Center 
was established in Brussels with the purpose that the EU would be able 
command operations of smaller size from Brussels.18 Furthermore the EU 
has developed operational military capabilities,19 e.g. the EU Battle groups 
that received fully operation capability in January 2007. With the Battle 
group concept the EU has instruments for, when necessary, an early and 
rapid response. If so decided by the Council, the EU is able to undertake 
two concurrent single Battlegroup-sized (about 1 500 personnel strong) 
rapid-response-operations.20 With the Treaty of Lisbon running into force in 
2009 the ESDP were renamed to the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP).   
2.1 EU military operations 
Since the EU´s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) became 
operational in 2003 the EU has to today launched 27 crisis management 
missions, 9 of them being military operations.21 The first EU military 
operation was operation CONCORDIA22 deployed in the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia in 2003. The same year the humanitarian and rescue 
                                                
15 Council Decision 2001/79/CFSP of 22 January 2001 setting up the Military Committee 
of the European Union, 2001 O.J. (L 27/4). 
16 Council Decision 2005/395/CFSP of 10 May 2005 amending Decision 2001/80/CFSP on 
the establishment of the Military Staff of the European Union, 2005 O.J. (L 132/17). 
17 European Union External Action webpage: http://consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-
defence/csdp-structures-and-instruments/eu-agencies-on-csdp/european-defence-agency-
(brussels)?lang=en; European Defence Agency webpage: 
http://www.eda.europa.eu/Aboutus. 
18 Factsheet, The activation of the EU operations center, 22 May 2012. Available at: 
http://consilium.europa.eu/media/1634515/factsheet_opscentre_22_may_12.pdf, p 2.  
The EU Operations Centre was activated the first time in 2012 when the Foreign Affairs 
Council on 23 March 2012 decided to activate the EU Operation Centre in order to 
coordinate and strengthening civil-military synergies between the EU military operation 
EUNAVFOR ATALANTA, the EU military mission EUTM Somalia and the EU civilian 
mission EUCAP NESTOR.   
19 Deployment of European Military Capabilities, Common Security and Defence Policy, 
Updated January 2011. Available at: 
http://consilium.europa.eu/media/1222506/110106%20updated%20factsheet%20capacites
%20militaires%20-%20version%208_en.pdf.  
20 Factsheet from the EU Council Secretariat on the EU Battle groups: 
http://consilium.europa.eu/media/1222503/110106%20factsheet%20-%20battlegroups%20-
%20version%207_en.pdf.  
21 Overview of the missions and operations of the European Union April 2013:  
http://consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations?amp;lang=en.  
22 Council Joint Action No. 2003/92/CFSP of 27 January 2003 on the European Union 
military operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2003 O.J. (L 34/26).  
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task operation ARTEMIS23 occurred in RD Congo. The peacekeeping 
operation EUFOR ALTHEA24 was deployed in Bosnia – Herzegovina in 
2004 and is still on going. Operation AMIS II25 was a mixed military-
civilian operation, which took place in Sudan/Darfur in 2005-2006. 
Operation EUFOR RD Congo26 occurred 2006 in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo. The crisis management operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA27 was 
deployed in eastern Chad and northeast of the Central African Republic 
between 2008-2009 under a Chapter VII resolution.28 In 2008 operation 
EUNAVFOR Atalanta29 was launched at the cost of Somalia. The European 
Council has decided to extend operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta until 2014.30 
Operation EUTM Somalia31 was launched in Somalia 2010 in support of 
UN Security Council Resolution 187232 and is still ongoing. The recently 
launched EU military operation is EUTM Mali33 in 2013, aimed to 
contribute to the training of the Malian armed forces.  
                                                
23 Council Joint Action No. 2003/423/CFSP of 5 June 2003 on the European Union military 
operation in the Republic of Congo, 2003 O.J. (L 143/50).  
24 Council Joint Action 2004/319/CFSP of 12 July 2004 on the European Union military 
operation Bosnia Herzegovina, 2004 O.J. (L 252/10); Council Decision 2004:803/CFSP of 
25 November 2004 on the launching of the European Union military operation in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, 2004 O.J. (L 34/39).  
25 Council Joint Action 2005/557/CFSP of 20 July 2005 on the European Union civilian-
military supporting action to the African Union mission in the Darfur region of Sudan, O.J. 
(L 188/46).  
26 Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP of 27 April 2006 on the European Union military 
operation in support for the United Nations Missions in Democratic Republic of Congo 
(MONUC) during the election process, 2006 O.J. (L 116/98).  
27 Council Decision 2008/101/CFSP of 28 January 2008 on the launching of the European 
Union military operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic 
(Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA), 2008 O.J. (L 34/39). 
28 UNSC Res 1373 (28 September 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1373.  
 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/N0751615.pdf 
29 Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008 on a European Union 
military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of 
piracy and armed robbery off the Somalia coast, 2008 O.J. (L 301) 33; Council Decision 
2008/918/CFSP of 8 December 2008 on the launch of a European Union military operation 
to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed 
robbery off the Somali coast (Atalanta), 2008 O.J. (L 330/19).  
30 For an overview about EUNAVFOR Atalanta see: http://eunavfor.eu/. 31	  Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP of 15 February on a European Union military mission 
to contribute to the training of Somali security forces, 2010 O.J. (L 22) 16; Council 
Decision 2010/197/CFSP of 31 March 2010 on the launch of a European Union military 
mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces (EUTM Somalia), 2010 O.J. 
(L 87/33); Council Decision 2012/835/CFSP of 21 December 2012 extending Decision 
2010/96/CFSP on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of Somali 
security forces, 2010 O.J. (L 357/13).  
32 UNSC Res 1872 (26 May 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1872. 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/RES-1872%20EN.pdf 33	  Council Decision 2013/34/CFSP of 17 January 2013 on a European Union military 
mission to contribute to the training of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM Mali), 2013 O.J. 
(L 14/19); Council Decision 2013/87/CFSP of 18 February 2013 on the launch of a 
European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian Armed Forces 
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2.3  Conclusions 
This chapter has illustrated that EU military operations, and EU crisis 
management as a whole, is a moderately new phenomenon. During a time 
period of ten years the EU has launched 27 crisis management operations 
including 9 military operations. Hence, since the EU´s Common Defence 
and Security Policy became operational the EU has launched almost one 
military operation per year. The figures clearly demonstrate that the EU has 
progressively have added military capabilities and progressed its operational 
framework in the area of security and defence issues. The rapid 
development described in this chapter leads the author to conclude that it is 
no longer premature to argue that the EU as an international organisation 
today plays a prominent role in the maintenance of peace and security in the 
world.  
 
The EU has proven to have a military structure and an operational capability 
to conclude operations long outside the European territory, hence the EU 
can now be regarded as a military actor. Moreover, the EU´s development in 
security and defence issues over the past years makes the author to believe 
that the EU as an international organisation has broken the traditionally 
monopoly held by the UN, and to some extent the NATO and perhaps the 
African Union, as military actors in this field.  
  
Even if the EU at present can be considered a military actor, it should not be 
forgotten that it EU is still also somewhat a newcomer in the field of 
military operations. Nevertheless it is beyond the “age of innocence”, and it 
is thus now necessary to place attention to the EU´s role as a military actor 
and to examine its engagement in military operations and the legal 
framework governing it.  
 
                                                                                                                        
(EUTM Mali), 2013 O.J. (L 46/27). 	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3   The Legal Framework of EU 
Military Operations 
The previous chapter provided an overview of the EU´s development in 
becoming a military actor and how the EU in this regard has acquired an 
operational capability allowing it to deploy military operations in third 
countries within its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). With the 
increasing number of launched EU military operations questions emerge as 
for example the legal basis for military operations, the scope of the CSDP in 
the EU Treaty and the law governing the conduct of military operations.  
 
Even if the EU can be considered as a newcomer in the field of security and 
defence issues, the rapid development of the EU in this area makes it 
reasonable to predicate that the EU has past the “age of innocence” and thus 
a solid level of legal standards governing the conduct of EU in this respect 
can be demanded. Consequently this chapter provides an illustration of the 
legal framework applicable to EU military operations. Initially possible 
legal bases for a EU military operation are presented, followed by a 
description of the planning and decision making process. Thereafter an 
explanation of the command and control are given. The chapter ends with a 
brief overview of the relationship between human rights law and EU 
military operations.   
 
The EU initiates a military operation on the basis of an international 
mandate.34 Usually the mandate derives from a UN Security Council 
resolution, a peace agreement and/or the consent from the host state, thus 
several bases can be combined.35 Other bases in international law are also 
possible, for example the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which is a 
part of the legal basis in operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta.36  
  
                                                
34 Naert, Frederik. Accountability For Violations of Human Rights Law by EU Forces, 
2008, p. 377. 
35 Ibid.  
36 Naert, Frederik. Legal Aspects of EU Military Operations, 2011, p. 230.  
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3.1   Legal basis in the EU Treaty 
The Common Defence and Security Policy (CDSP) of the EU is regulated in 
Title V, Chapter 2, Section 2 of the TEU.37 According to Art. 42 TEU the 
CDSP is a part of the wider Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
of the EU and is therefore subject to the general CFSP rules listed in Title V 
of the TEU. 
 
The basis for CSDP missions is set out in Art. 42 TEU, expressing inter alia 
“The common security and defence policy shall provide the Union with an 
operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may 
use them on missions outside the Union for peacekeeping, conflict 
prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the 
principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks 
shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States”.  
 
The CSDP task-catalogue is further defined in Art. 43 TEU stating that “The 
tasks shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue 
tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-
keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including 
peace-making and post-conflict stabilization. All these tasks may contribute 
to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in 
combating terrorism in their territories”. The missions referred to in Art. 43 
TEU contains the so-called “Petersberg Tasks Plus”.38 It is argued that the 
phrase “task of combat forces in crisis management, including 
peacemaking” in Art.43 TEU involves peace enforcement and thus 
potentially high intensity operations involving combat.39 Due to the wide 
range of possible missions to undertake, the EU can create a military 
operation aimed to serve the specific situation on the ground.40  
 
As regards the EU as a defence community Art. 42 (2) TEU provides for the 
“possibility to frame a common Union defence policy that will lead to a 
common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so 
                                                
37 Treaty on European Union (TEU). All articles of the TEU referred to in this text are the 
articles of the Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union of 30 March 2010, 
2010 O.J. (C 83/1). 
38 See supra note 13. When Art. 43 in Treaty of Lisbon came into force the Petersberg 
Tasks was extended to include e.g. joint disarmament operations, military advice and 
assistance tasks, thus the name changed to Petersberg Tasks Plus. 
39 Naert, Frederik. International Law Aspects of the EU´s Security and Defence policy, with 
a Particular Focus on the Law of Armed Conflict and Human Rights, 2009, p. 435. 
40 Naert, Frederik. Legal Aspects of EU Military Operations, 2011, p. 222.  
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decides”. Nevertheless, it is understood as an accepted opinion that the EU´s 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) will not establish a EU army 
responsible for the defence of the EU member states.41 Art. 42 (2) 
furthermore contain the relationship between the EU and the NATO and the 
so-called Berlin Plus arrangements.42 Art. 42 (7) TEU includes a mutual 
assistance clause, “If a member state is the victim of armed aggression on its 
territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid 
and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 
of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character 
of the security and defence policy of certain member states. Commitments 
and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation”. Although there is no provision in the 
TEU stipulating that the obligation in Art. 42 (7) TEU has to be provided in 
the framework of the Union.43 For those EU member states that are a 
member of the NATO, this organisation should remain the foundation of 
their collective defence and the forum for their implementation, by virtue of 
Arts. 42 (2) and 42 (7).     
 
Art. 42 (5) and Art. 44 TEU provides for enhanced cooperation between the 
member states by making it possible to entrust the execution of a task within 
the CSDP framework to a group of member states that are willing and have 
the necessary capabilities for such a task. According to Art. 44 the member 
states involved shall in association with the High Representatives agree 
among themselves on the management of the task and keep the Council 
regularly informed about its process. If the completion of the task should 
entail major consequences or require amendments of the objective, scope 
and conditions determined for the task, the Council shall adopt the 
necessary decisions, according to Art. 44 TEU.  
 
The European Defence Agency (EDA) is the main body in charge, subject 
to the authority of the Council, of military capabilities pursuant to Arts. 42 
(3) and 45 TEU. Art. 42 (3) stipulate that member states shall make civilian 
and military capabilities available to the Union for the implementation of 
the Common Security and Defence Policy.  
 
Arts. 42 (6) and 46 TEU provides the possibility for structured cooperation 
for “those member states whose military capabilities fulfill higher criteria 
                                                
41 Falco, Valentina. The Internal Legal Order of the European Union as a Complementary 
Framework for its Obligations under IHL, 2009, p. 175.  
42 For more information see: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-11-
11%20Berlin%20Plus%20press%20note%20BL.pdf.  
43 Naert, Frederik. Legal Aspects of EU Military Operations, 2011, p. 222. 
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and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area 
with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent 
structured cooperation within the Union framework.” Consistent with Art. 
42 (6) the structured cooperation is governed by Art. 46 TEU and shall not 
affect the provisions of Art. 43.    
3.2.1 Council decision 
A EU military operation is performed under a mandate decided by the 
European Council (hereafter referred to as the Council). Hence the basic 
legal instrument for each EU military operations is a Council decision 
(previously called Council Joint Action) adopted on the basis of Art. 43 
TEU, in conjunction with Art. 28 TEU.44 In accordance with Art. 31 TEU 
the Council decides with unanimity, with the possibility of abstentions.45 
 
A Council decision is not merely a decision adopted by the member states 
collectively, it is an act of the Union.46 A Council decision generally 
contains the mission and the mandate, the political and military control and 
direction.47 Furthermore a Council decision designate the commanders and 
headquarters, specify the command and control relations and contain 
provisions on the status of the mission, status of forces, financial 
arrangements, participation of third states (i.e. non-EU member states), 
relations with other actors, handling of EU classified information and 
information about the launching and duration of the operation.48  
 
It is not uncommon that a Council decision is adopted before the planning 
process is completed. As a consequence, when the planning process is 
completed the Council adopts a further separate decision for the launching 
                                                
44 Zyberi, Gentian. The applicability of general principles and instruments of International 
Law to peace missions of the European Union, 2012, p. 27.  
45 According to Art. 31 TEU, second subparagraph, any member of the Council may 
qualify its abstention by making a formal declaration, in that case, it shall not be obliged to 
apply the decision, but shall accept that the decision commits the Union. In a spirit of 
mutual solidarity, the member state concerned shall refrain from any action likely to 
conflict with or impede Union action based on that decision and the other member states 
shall respect its position. If the members of the Council qualifying their abstention in this 
way represent at least one third of the member states comprising at least one third of the 
population of the Union, the decision shall not be adopted. 
46 Naert, Frederik. The Application of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law 
in Drafting EU Missions Mandates and Rules of Engagement, 2011, p. 5.   
47 Ibid.  
48 Zyberi, Gentian. The applicability of general principles and instruments of International 
Law to peace missions of the European Union, 2012, p. 30; Naert, Frederik. Legal Aspects 
of EU Military Operations, 2011, p. 226. 
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of the operation, together with a decision approving the Operation Plan and 
when applicable, the Rules of Engagement.49  
3.2.2 International agreements  
Pursuant to Art. 37 TEU and Art. 318 Treaty of the Function of the 
European Union (TFEU), the EU “may conclude agreements with one or 
more States or international organisations”, thus provides the EU the 
authority to conclude international agreements in the realm of their 
Common Security and Defence Policy. An international agreement is 
established by the EU as a separate legal person50 and not by the member 
states collectively.51 By virtue of Art. 216 (2) TFEU an international 
agreement is binding upon the institutions of the European Union and on its 
member states.  
 
International agreements are concluded regularly, agreement on the 
participation of a third State (see below) and on the status of forces (see 
below) are the most frequently signed agreements.52 Other types of 
agreements can e.g. comprise the extension of a status of forces agreement 
from a non-EU operation to a EU military operation by an agreement or 
through a UN Security Council resolution. The latter was the practice in 
operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina.53 
 
Two agreements between the EU member states themselves are still pending 
its entry into force, “Agreement between the Member States of the European 
Union” (EU SOFA)54 and “Agreement between the member states of the 
European Union concerning claims introduced by each member state against 
any other member state for damage to any property owned, used or operated 
by it or injury or death suffered by any military or civilian staff of its 
                                                
49 Zyberi, Gentian, The applicability of general principles and instruments of International 
Law to peace missions of the European Union, 2012, p. 30.  
50 The EU has legal personality in accordance with Art. 47 TEU.    
51 Naert, Frederik. The Application of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law 
in Drafting EU Missions Mandates and Rules of Engagement, 2011, p. 5.   
52 Naert, Frederik, Accountability for Violations of Human Rights law by EU forces, 2008, 
p. 337.  
53 UNSC Res 1551 (9 July 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1551,§ 20. 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/N0441937.pdf 
54 Council Agreement 2003/C 321/02 of 31 December 2003 between the Member States of 
the European Union concerning the status of military and civilian staff seconded to the 
institutions of the European Union, of the headquarters and forces which may be made 
available to the European Union in the context of the preparation and execution of the tasks 
referred to in Article 17(2) of the Treaty on European Union, including exercises, and of the 
military and civilian staff of the Member States put at the disposal of the European Union 
to act in this context, 2003 O.J. (C 321/6)  
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services, in the context of an EU crisis management operation”.55  
 
The EU can also conclude a transit agreement (comparable to status of 
forces agreement but of a smaller dimension) with third states. For example 
did the EU establish a transit agreement with Cameroon in operation 
EUFOR Tchad/RCA.56 Alternative status agreements may also be used.57  
 
3.2.2.1 Status of Forces Agreement  
Normally the EU concludes a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the 
host state in order to regulate and define the status and activities of the EU 
military operation in the host state.58 A model SOFA exists for EU military 
operations. The SOFA comprise regulations concerning the entry into the 
host states territory, the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by sending states, 
freedom of movement, immunities and privileges, the wearing of uniforms 
and carrying of arms, security of the forces and military police, handling of 
deceased personnel, communications, handling of claims, implementing 
arrangements and the settling of disputes.59  
 
A SOFA includes the consent from the host state. However, ordinarily the 
consent from the host state is already managed before the conclusion of the 
SOFA takes place. On the other hand, if the legal basis of the EU military 
operation is a Chapter VII mandate from the UN Security Council, the 
consent from the host state is not needed, but can still be recognized.60 If a 
EU military operation is established on short notice and the SOFA cannot be 
concluded or entry into force in time, the host state can grant the military 
operation some immunities and privileges via unilateral declarations.61  
 
                                                
55 Council Agreement 2004/C 116/01 of 20 April 2004 between the Member States of the 
European Union concerning claims introduced by each Member State against any other 
Member State for damage to any property owned, used or operated by it or injury or death 
suffered by any military or civilian staff of its services, in the context of an EU crisis 
management operation, 2004 O.J. (C 116/1).  
56 Council Decision 2008/178/CFSP of 28 January 2008 concerning the conclusion of the 
Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Cameroon on the status of the 
European Union-led forces in transit within the territory of the Republic of Cameroon, 2008 O.J. 
(L 57/30).  
57 Naert, Frederik. Legal Aspects of EU Military Operations, 2011, p. 231.  
58 Ibid.  
59 Naert, Frederik. The Application of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law 
in Drafting EU Missions Mandates and Rules of Engagement, 2011, p. 6.   
60 Naert, Frederik. International Law Aspects of the EU´s Security and Defence Policy, with 
a particular focus on the Law of Armed Conflict and Human Rights, 2008, p. 68.  
61 Ibid. p. 69.  
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3.2.2.2 Participating agreements  
A participating agreement is used when a third state take part in a EU 
military operation and encompasses the modalities of the third states 
participation.62 On the basis of a model agreement a participating agreement 
can be settled on ad hoc basis for a specific operation. A participating 
agreement can also be settled as a framework agreement, than covering EU 
operations in generally.63 A framework participating agreement has been 
signed with for example Turkey64, Norway65, Canada66, The United States 
of America67 and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia68 
 
In a participating agreement the participating state usually associates itself 
with the Council decision governing the operation and commits itself to 
provide and contribute to the operation and to bear the cost for its 
involvement.69 Additionally a participating agreement stipulates e.g. that the 
personnel from the third state is included by any Status of Forces 
Agreement established by the EU and the regulations concerning transfer of 
command and control.70  
 
Within the framework of participating agreements the EU decision-making 
autonomy is safeguarded, nonetheless all participating states normally have 
                                                
62 Naert, Frederik. The Application of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law 
in Drafting EU Missions Mandates and Rules of Engagement, 2011, p. 6.  
63 Naert, Frederik. Legal Aspects of EU Military Operations, 2011, p. 232. 
64 Council Decision 2006/482/CFSP of 10 April 2006 concerning the conclusion of the 
Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey establishing a 
framework for the participation of the Republic of Turkey in the European Union crisis 
management operations, 2006 O.J (L 189/17), entered into force 1 August 2007.  
65 Council Decision 2005/191/CFSP of 18 October 2004 concerning the conclusion of 
agreements between the European Union and the Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of 
Norway and Romania establishing a framework for the participation of the Republic of 
Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway and Romania in the European Union crisis-management 
operations 2006 O.J. (L 67/8).  
66 Council Decision 2005/851/CFSP of 21 November 2005 concerning the conclusion of 
the Agreement between the European Union and Canada establishing a framework for the 
participation of Canada in the European Union crisis management operations, 2005 O.J. (L 
315/20). 
67 Council Decision 2011/318/CFSP of 31 March 2011 on the signing and conclusion of the 
Framework Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on 
the participation of the United States of America in European Union crisis management 
operations, 2011 O.J. (L 143/1).  
68 Council Decision 2012/768/CFSP of 9 March 2012 on the signing and conclusion of the 
Agreement between the European Union and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
establishing a framework for the participation of the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia in European Union crisis management operations, 2012, O.J. (L 338/3), entered 
into force 1 April 2013.  
69 Naert, Frederik. Legal Aspects of EU Military Operations, 2011, p. 233. 
70 Naert, Frederik. The Application of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law 
in Drafting EU Missions Mandates and Rules of Engagement, 2011, p. 6.  
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the same rights and obligations as EU member states when it comes to the 
day-to-day organisation of the operation. A Committee of Contributors may 
be established to provide a forum for the exercise of these rights.71 The EU 
will consult with the participating states regarding the terminating of an 
operation.72 Furthermore there are normally additional agreements between 
the EU and the participating states regulating different aspects of their 
cooperation in the operation, e.g. technical arrangements and memoranda of 
understanding.73 
3.2   The planning and decision-making  
process  
The scope of the EU´s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 
within the EU Treaty includes regulations as regards the process to plan a 
EU military operation and regulations regarding the power to adopt 
decisions related to EU military operations. The planning and decision-
making process is important for an understanding of the division of labor 
between the different actors involved at EU level in a military operation and 
the legal documents adopted by them. Also, the decision-making process is 
significant for the question of responsibility (further examined in chapter 
four).  
  
As previously described, the Council is the key decision-making body as 
regards the EU´s CSDP and for the launching of military operations. The 
ability to initiate or propose a decision to be taken by the Council is 
designated to the member states or the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Lady Ashton), assisted by the 
European External Actions Service pursuant to Arts. 27 and 30 TEU. The 
High Representative, assisted by EEAS, is also preparing a Council decision 
according to Art. 27 TEU. The preparation is also conducted by different 
kind of preparatory bodies that prepare and advice an upcoming Council 
decision, these bodies e.g. includes the Political and Security Committee 
(PSC),74 the EU Military Committee (EUMC), including the European 
Union Military Committee Working Group/Headline Goal Task Force 
                                                
71 Naert, Frederik. Legal Aspects of EU Military Operations, 2011, p. 233.  
72 Ibid.   
73 Naert, Frederik. The Application of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law 
in Drafting EU Missions Mandates and Rules of Engagement, 2011, p. 6.  
74 Council Decision 2001/78/CFSP of 22 January 2001 setting up the Political and Security 
Committee, 2001 O.J. (L 27/1).  
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(EUMCWG/HTF),75 the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis 
Management (CIVCOM),76 the Political-Military Group (PMG) and 
geographical and thematic working groups.77  
 
The task to ensure the implementation of a Council decision is attributed to 
the High Representative, assisted by the European External Actions Service, 
by virtue of Art. 27 TEU. Additionally also the Political and Security 
Committee (PSC) shall monitor the implementation of agreed policies, 
without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative according to 
Art. 38 TEU. Moreover the PSC shall, pursuant of Art. 38 TEU, exercise 
under the responsibility of the Council and the High Representative, the 
political control and strategic direction of the crisis management operations 
referred to in Art. 43 (the task-catalogue). The PSC is a permanent body 
composed of national representatives at ambassador’s level78which have an 
important role in the planning and decision making process.79 By virtue of 
Art. 38 the PSC can be delegated some decision making power as the 
Council may authorize the PSC, for the purpose and for the duration of a 
crisis management operation as determined by the Council, to take the 
relevant decisions concerning the political control and strategic direction of 
the operation, e.g. decisions to modify the planning documents including the 
Operation Plan, the Chain of Command and the Rules of Engagement and to 
decide on the appointment of the EU Operation Commander and the EU 
Forces Commander.80 However the power to adopt decisions relating to the 
objectives and the termination of the operation is entrusted with the 
Council.81 When a EU Operation Commander has been chosen for the 
operation he/she also plays a role in the planning process.82  
 
                                                
75 Council Decision 2001/79/CFSP of 22 January 2001 setting up the Military Committee 
of the European Union, 2001 O.J. (L 27/4).   
76 Council Decision 2000/354/CFSP of 22 May 2000 setting up a Committee for Civilian 
Aspects of Crisis Management, 2000 O.J. (L 127/1).  
77 Naert, Frederik. Legal Aspects of EU Military Operations, 2011, p. 224. 
78 Zwanenburg, Marten, Toward a more mature ESDP: Responsibility for violations of 
International Humanitarian Law by EU crisis management operations, 2008, p. 397. 
79 Naert, Frederik. Legal Aspects of EU Military Operations, 2011, p. 227. 
80 Ibid.  
81 Naert, Frederik. The Application of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law 
in Drafting EU Missions Mandates and Rules of Engagement, 2011, p. 5.   
82 Naert, Frederik. Legal Aspects of EU Military Operations, 2011, p. 225.  
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3.2.3 The Operation Plan, Rules of 
Engagement and other operational 
documents 
Before an operational document is handed over to the Council, via the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), it is transferred to 
the Political and Security Committee, following a survey by the appropriate 
predatory body, normally the EU Military Committee (EUMC), the 
Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) and/or 
the Political-Military Group (PMG) that provides guidance and suggestion 
and might modify the document.83  
 
For each EU military operation an Operation Plan (OPLAN) is established. 
The OPLAN is ordinarily developed by the EU Operation Commander and 
agreed upon by the Council in unanimity. The OPLAN covers the features 
of the operation and is often extensive, because of many annexes. The 
annexes to the OPLAN usually address inter alia the legal issues and the 
question of use of force in the operation.84  
 
If a EU military operation might involve use of force beyond self defence 
Rules of Engagement (ROE) are established after a request from the EU 
Operation Commander and after authorization from the Council.85 Equally 
with the OPLAN, the Council agrees on the ROE in unanimity.86 The RUE 
is based on the EUs policy on the use of force87 and can be explained as 
instructions concerning the use of force. Ordinarily both the OPLAN and 
the ROE are classified documents and hence not legal instruments.88 
Member states can issue caveats applicable to the forces they put at disposal 
to a EU military operation. However the caveats may merely impose further 
limitations on the use of force. The use of caveats license member states to 
guarantee that their national forces respect political or legal restrictions that 
are specific to that special member state, without imposing these limitations 
on other states. The ROE and the OPLAN cannot oblige a specific force of a 
member state to do something contrary to their national law or to a specific 
                                                
83 Naert, Frederik. The Application of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law 
in Drafting EU Missions Mandates and Rules of Engagement, 2011, p. 9. 
84 Ibid.; See Sanitised version of the FYROM Operation Plan, EU Council Doc. 7855/03 of 
28 March 2003, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/03/st07/st07855.en03.pdf.  
85 Ibid., p. 9.  
86 Naert, Frederik. Legal Aspects of EU Military Operations, 2011, p. 227.  
87 EU Council Doc. 17168/09 of 2 January 2010 on EU Concept for the Use of Force in 
EU-led Military Operation, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st17/st17168-
ex01.en09.pdf.   
88 Naert, Frederik. Legal Aspects of EU Military Operations, 2011, p. 227. 
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treaty obligation.89 Other use of force, e.g. to detain criminals are also 
covered in the ROE.90   
 
The OPLAN is complemented and executed with a range of other 
operational documents, such as the Crisis Management Concept, a 
conceptual framework that explains the EU´s general approach to the 
management of a certain crisis.91 Another operational document is the 
Military Strategic Options, which includes among other things a valuation 
of the feasibility and risk, an organisation for the Command and Control and 
a valuation of personnel necessities. The EU Operation Commander 
normally develops Concept of Operations document (CONOPS) that 
contains the guidelines on the use of force. The CONOPS is complemented 
by a Statement of Requirements, which contains the details of the forces, 
personnel and assets in the operation.92 The planning process also contains a 
force generation process.93 
3.3   The command and control 
A clarification of the command and control in a EU military operation is 
crucial for the question of division of authority between the EU and the 
participating states in an operation. The command and control has a close 
link to the questions of responsibility (further examined in chapter four) and 
to determine who has the responsibility to ensure that the conduct of the EU 
military operation respects IHL.     
  
The EU Operation Commander, appointed by the Council, has the highest 
level of military command in a EU military operation. The EU Operation 
Commander leads the EU military operation under the strategic guidance 
and direction of the Political and Security Committee. The member states 
that participate in an operation transfer the authority of their troops to the 
EU Operation Commander who then obtain operational control and/or 
command over the troops put at his/her disposal.94 When national authorities 
transfer such an authority, the state is in principle no longer allowed to give 
                                                
89 F. Naert, The Application of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law in 
Drafting EU Missions Mandates and Rules of Engagement (2011) p. 10. 
90 Ibid.   
91 Ibid., p. 9.  
92 Naert, Frederik. The Application of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law 
in Drafting EU Missions Mandates and Rules of Engagement, 2011, p. 9. 
93 EU Council Doc. 10690/08 of 16 June 2008 on EU Concept for Forces Generation, 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st10/st10690.en08.pdf.   
94 Naert, Frederik. Legal Aspects of EU Military Operations, 2011, p. 225.  
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the forces operation directions.95 The next command level under the 
Operation Commander is the Force Commander, the highest individual in 
the field.96 
 
Full command covers every aspect of military operations and administration 
and exists only within national services.97 Thus full command is only 
available for participating States, due to the wording “national services”.98  
However via the transfer of authority participating states transfer specific 
features of the command and control to the EU Operation Commander. 
When the participating states wish to get back their forces to their command 
and control they can make a reverse transfer of authority.99 
 
A member state, or the NATO under the Berlin plus arrangements can 
provide Operational Headquarters to a military operation. If the EU 
Operations Centre is activated it can also work as an operational headquarter 
in a military operation.100  
 
Even if not a part of the military chain of command the EU Military 
Committee (EUMC) is the highest military body established within the 
Council. The EUMC consists of the defence ministers in the member states, 
represented by their military representatives.101 The EUMC offer guidance 
and suggestions to the Political and Security Committee on military matters 
and gives military direction regarding all military activities. The EUMC 
moreover supervise the performance of a military operation executed under 
the responsibility of the EU Operation Commander.102 
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3.4   The relationship between EU military  
operations and International Human 
Rights law  
This section exemplifies very briefly the correlation between international 
human rights law and EU military operations, as human rights law is the 
most apparent alternative and/or complementary legal regime of 
international humanitarian law.        
 
The EU mainly focuses on human rights law as the proper standard of 
conduct for a military operation.103 The applicability of human rights as a 
legal regime in EU military operations are debated as regards the context of 
extraterritorial application of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
the question of derogation in times of emergencies, the applicability of 
human rights to peace operations, the relationship between human rights and 
international humanitarian law104 and the impact of UN Security Council 
mandates on human rights.105   
 
According to Art. 6 TEU the EU “recognizes the rights, freedoms and 
principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union of 7 December 2000, as adopted at Strasbourg, on 12 December 
2007, which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties”. The EU must 
obey human rights as general principles of EU law and is in the process to 
accede to the European Convention on Human Rights.106  
                                                
103 Naert, Frederik. Legal Aspects of EU Military Operations, 2011, p. 236.  
104 Updated European Union Guidelines on promoting compliance with international 
humanitarian law (IHL), 2009 O.J. (L 303/12), article 12 states: ” It is important to 
distinguish between international human rights law and IHL. They are distinct bodies of 
law and, while both are principally aimed at protecting individuals, there are important 
differences between them. In particular, IHL is applicable in time of armed conflict and 
occupation. Conversely, human rights law is applicable to everyone within the jurisdiction 
of the State concerned in time of peace as well as in time of armed conflict. Thus while 
distinct, the two sets of rules may both be applicable to a particular situation and it is 
therefore sometimes necessary to consider the relationship between them”, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:303:0012:0017:EN:PDF.  
105 By virtue of Article 103 of the UN Charter, obligations under the UN Charter prevail 
over other international agreements. Where UN Security Council resolutions authorize the 
use of all necessary means, State often invoke this as a basis for partially limiting or setting 
aside some human rights in peace operations.   
106 Naert, Frederik. Legal Aspects of EU Military Operations, 2011, p. 237; Press Release 
Council of Europe DC041 (2013), Milestone reached in negotiations on accession of EU to 
the European Convention on Human Rights, 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=DCPR041(2013)&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=origi
nal&BackColorInternet=F5CA75&BackColorIntranet=F5CA75&BackColorLogged=A9B
ACE.  
 28 
 
EU military planning documents (such as the Operational Plan) 
acknowledge internationally accepted standards of human rights law.107 As 
an example, in operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta suspected pirates or armed 
robbers who are captured by EU-led forces at sea “may not be transferred to 
a third State unless the conditions for the transfer have been agreed with that 
third State in a manner consistent with relevant international law, notably 
international law on human rights, in order to guarantee in particular that no 
one shall be subject to the death penalty, to torture or to any cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment”.108  
3.5   Conclusions  
This chapter has given an overview of the legal framework of EU military 
operations. The examination demonstrates that the EU has a substantial and 
compound legal framework for its military operations, governed both in the 
EU treaty, in international law and developed in practice. Although a more 
truthful description of the EU´s Common Security and Defence Policy 
would entail a modification of the wording “common defence policy” as a 
common defence of the EU does not exist at present. 
 
The wide range of possible military operations for the EU to undertake 
referred to in Art. 43 TEU makes it reasonable to state that the legal 
framework can differ from operation to operation. Consequently the EU has 
instruments at its disposal to designee an operation to meet the specific 
circumstances on the ground. Art. 43 refers to “peace-making” which could 
be argued to have a close link to “peace-enforcement”, thus the EU Treaty 
might provide a reference to an operation involving high level combat.    
 
At the same time as the legal framework is substantial, it is also complex 
with a lot of mechanism. It is the impression of the author that the planning 
and decision-making process is an extensive procedure with a lot of 
different actors and bodies involved. The process seems to occur between 
planners and experts on the one side, and with politicians and diplomats on 
the other side, making the way for a rather complex management and a 
fragment of confusion as regards the division of labour between the 
different actors. For the purpose of clarification, it is only the Council who 
                                                
107 Ibid., p. 237.  
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has the power do adopt legal acts concerning the launching, termination and 
conduct of a EU military operation. Legal regulations appear in the 
Operation Plan, Rules of Procedure, Status of Forces Agreement and 
participating agreements. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) plays 
a central role, with the possibility to exercise, under the responsibility of the 
Council, political control and strategic direction of the military operation 
and to take relevant decisions hereto, being the most far-reaching. The EU 
Military Committee (EUMC) provides advices and makes recommendations 
to the PCS on military matters and converts the strategic directions from the 
PSC to military directives that are transferred to the EU Operation 
Commander. The EUMC monitors the accurate execution of an operation, 
which is conducted under the responsibility of the EU Operation 
Commander. Regardless the fact that the EUMC is the highest military body 
set up within the Council, the EUMC is not a part of the military chain of 
command. 
 
The question of command and control also requires clarification. The chain 
of command and control goes from the political level to military-strategic 
and an operational level. It is beyond doubt that the EU does not have an 
exclusive competence of the conduct of an EU military operation since the 
EU have to relay on its member states and third states to contribute forces to 
the operation. A EU military operation is governed by a decision from the 
Council, thus an operation is performed under the general authority by the 
Council, exercised by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) on the 
Councils behalf. It is described that member states and third states 
participating in the operation normally transfer to a certain extent the 
command and control over their troops to the EU Operation Commander, 
but keep the highest authority, the full command, for them selves. This is 
contradictory for the author, how can the participating states keep the “full 
command” but at the same time transfer authority to the EU Operation 
Commander? Additional, the fact that the participating states make a reverse 
transfer of authority when they wish to get back their forces to there 
complete command and control shows that if they would possess full 
command during the operation, the transfer for authority would not be 
needed. Moreover, the legal instruments governing a EU military operation 
is binding on all participating states and thus limit their freedom and power. 
It is problematic to accept that the participating states can maintain the “full 
command” during a military operation.  It leads the author to conclude that 
the division of command and control are not a fully developed system. In 
the view of the author a significant degree of the authority over the EU-led 
forces are transferred to the EU in a military operation.  
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Another aspect of the legal framework is the political influence which most 
likely is apparent as the decision-making bodies consist of ministers (the 
European Council) and ambassadors (the Political and Security Committee). 
On the other hand, while these bodies consist of representatives from the 
member states and the decision-making by rule takes place unanimously, 
this is a way for the member states to exercise a form of control over the 
operation. Also, the unanimously decision-making gives the CSDP an 
intergovernmental element to it. It is not unlikely to become increasingly 
difficult to reach consensus among all EU member states. A likely 
consequence is that EU member states are seeking bilateral deals. In this 
regard the possibility for enhance cooperation in Arts. 42 (5) and 44 TEU 
can be useful in simplifying the procedure to launch an operation and to 
make the planning and decision-making process more efficient.  
 
The legal framework of EU military operations appears to contain 
instruments for the EU to launch and perform a wide range of military 
operations and to manage legal challenges that might occur. However 
outstanding issues exists, for example certain aspects regarding the 
application of human rights law and the division of command and control. 
The maturity test for the legal framework will occur when the EU launch, or 
an operation develops into, a more complex military operation in a higher 
risk theatre. In such a context the EU Battle groups, a significant military 
capability for the EU which have been operational since 2007 but still have 
not been deployed, could be tested for the first time and potentially raise 
legal challenges.  
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4   The EU and International 
  Humanitarian Law 
The previous chapters concluded that after rapid developments in military 
operations, the EU can now be considered an important global player and 
military actor in maintaining peace and security. As a consequence, the 
EU´s role as an international organisation and a military actor deserves more 
attention, with regard to questions in terms of applicable law that may arise. 
One of the questions is the relationship between the EU as an international 
organisation and international humanitarian law (IHL). Chapter three 
described the legal framework applicable to EU military operations, with the 
exception of IHL, which requires its own examination in relation to EU 
military operations.  
 
The widespread accepted sui generis nature of the EU speaks against to 
make parallels between the EU and other subject of international law 
regarding the relationship with IHL109 By virtue of the EU´s sui generis 
(unique in characteristics) nature as an international organisation and of the 
EU´s development in crisis management operations the EU can be 
considered as novice in the field of IHL. The attention from scholars 
regarding studies of international organisations as military actors and their 
relationship to international humanitarian law have been focused on the UN 
and NATO, while research with regard to the EU in this field has been very 
modest.110   
 
This chapter highlights the relationship between the EU and IHL. In this 
regard potential IHL obligations for the EU and the troop contributing states 
are examined and it is examined if EU-led operations may become “a party 
to an armed conflict” according to IHL. 
 
 
 
                                                
109 Falco, Valentina. The internal legal order of the European Union as a complementary 
framework for its obligations under IHL, 2009, pp. 171-172. 
110 Zwanenburg, Marten. The duty to respect International Humanitarian Law during 
European Union-led operations, 2012, p. 66.    
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4.1   International legal personality  
In order for the EU to obtain obligations under international humanitarian 
law it is required that the EU have internal legal personality, distinguished 
from its member states.111 According to the International Court of Justice´s 
Advisory Opinion in the Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of 
the United Nations “international legal personality is the capacity to bear 
rights and obligations under international law”.112 This finding is a part from 
the UN, also acknowledged to relate to other international organisations.113 
Consequently, with lack of international legal personality it is not possible 
to obtain rights and obligations under international law.114 The EU has legal 
personality by virtue of Art. 47 TEU. It has been accepted that the legal 
personality of the EU includes international legal personality and thus the 
EU can bear rights and obligations under international law.115 
4.2   Treaty law   
The main realm of IHL obligations are laid down in treaty law, inter alia the 
1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 two Additional Protocols. 
However, the EU is not a party any IHL treaties.116 An immense difficulty 
for the applicability of IHL to the EU as such (a military actor distinct from 
its troop contributing member states) is that regional and international 
organisations are barred from becoming parties to the IHL treaties.117 It is 
only possible for a “Power” to accede to the Geneva Conventions and the 
Additional Protocols118 and the prevailing interpretation of the word 
“Power” only addresses states, thus only they can ratify the IHL treaties.119 
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Consequently the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols do not 
generate any IHL obligations for the EU.120  
 
EU military operations are executed by troops put at the disposal of EU 
member states and non-member states, hence these states has their own IHL 
obligations.121 The two Geneva Conventions are universally ratified and 
subsequently all states are parties thereof. Moreover all EU member states 
are parties to the two Additional Protocols.122 Nevertheless examples 
illustrates that the IHL-treaty framework of the states participating in EU 
military operations are far from uniform. For example, neither the United 
Kingdom nor Ireland have ratified the 1954 Convention on the Protection of 
Cultural Property in Times of War,123 hence in a EU military operation 
where troops are put at the disposal of the United Kingdom or Ireland these 
troops would not be bound by this treaty. Furthermore, neither Finland nor 
Poland has ratified the 1997 Ottawa Treaty on anti-personnel land mines,124 
though Finland has agreed with the EU not to use antipersonnel landmines 
in CSDP operations.125 As already mentioned, EU military operations are 
often, in addition to the EU-member states, composed of non-member 
States.126An illustrative example is Turkey who has e.g. participated in 
operation Concordia, Althea and EUFOR RD Congo but has not signed, nor 
ratified the two Additional Protocols. This is controversial since these 
Protocols are crucial in order to complement the protection granted by the 
Geneva Conventions to victims of both international and non-international 
conflicts.127 Although it could be argued that those countries that have not 
ratified the Additional Protocols could be bound by them via customary law. 
Noteworthy is thus that Additional Protocol I has been acknowledged as 
customary law, while the customary nature of Additional Protocol II is 
debated.128 Furthermore, other IHL treaties, such as the Optional Protocol 
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on the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of 
Children in Armed Conflict129 are not uniformed ratified by either EU 
member states or the non-member states that have been engaged in EU 
military operations.130    
4.3   Customary International Law 
Moreover, IHL obligations can be laid down in customary international 
law.131 The EU has confirmed that most of the rules in the main IHL treaties 
are considered as customary international law: “the Geneva Conventions 
enjoy universal acceptance, and most of the provisions of the Conventions 
and their 1977 Additional Protocols are generally accepted as customary 
law”.132  
 
It is acknowledged that international organisations that possess international 
legal personality are subject to the rules of general international law.133 The 
possession of international legal personality means to be bound by general 
international law (customary international law and general principles of 
law).134 Further, the International Court of Justice has pointed out 
“international organisations are subjects of international law, and, as such, 
are bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of 
international law”.135 As aforementioned, the EU has international legal 
personality why these reasoning can apply to the EU.136 Moreover the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) has found that the European Communities 
are bound by general international law, e.g. in the Racke case the ECJ stated 
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“the European Community must respect international law in the exercise of 
its powers. It is therefore required to comply with the rules of customary 
international law”.137 The latter finding referred to the European 
Community, because the ECJ at that time lacked jurisdiction over the EU´s 
Common Foreign and Security Policy.138 However, in the case Air 
Transport Association of America the ECJ in the Grand Chamber found that 
“the European Union is bound to observe international law in its entirety, 
including customary international law”.139 Thus the ECJ has acknowledged 
that customary international law applies to the EU.140   
 
Due to the principle of functionality, international organisations are not 
bound to the full range of customary international law, but only to those 
rules of customary law that are relevant for their activities.141 An analogy 
has been made in this regard142 to the applicability of IHL in UN 
peacekeeping operations and an argument raised by Shraga: “The principle 
of functionality which circumscribes the international personality of the 
organisation and its legal capacity, also determines the scope of the 
applicable law to activities carried out by United Nations in the 
performance of its functions…The ever-growing involvement of UN forces 
in situations of armed conflict warrants that International Humanitarian 
Law be made applicable to them by analogy and as appropriate, when they, 
like states, are engaged in military operations as combatants”.143 
 
Thus, customary IHL applies when an international organisation has the 
possibility to preform military operations that could involve armed force.144  
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4.4  EU military operation as a party to an  
armed conflict 
According to the main legal treaty instruments of IHL, i.e. common Art. 2 
of the Geneva Conventions, Art. 1 of Additional Protocol 1 and Art. 1 of 
Additional Protocol II, international humanitarian law or the ius in bello 
only applies to situations of armed conflict and occupation. Hitherto no EU 
military operation has been involved in an armed conflict,145 but the 
likelihood for EU-led forces to become engaged in an armed conflict, 
voluntary or not, cannot be ignored.146 Some illustration thereof is provided.  
 
The EU military operations Artemis and EUFOR Tchad/RCA were 
governed by a Chapter VII mandate, subsequently these operations was 
authorized to use all necessary measures including the use of armed force 
beyond self-defence in order to achieve their mandate.147 According to 
reports from operation Artemis EU-led forces where under attack and 
returned fired at two occasions, at one of these occasion two attackers where 
killed.148 Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA took place in Chad and the Central 
African Republic in a tense political and security environment. Both 
international and non-international armed conflicts where occurring in the 
area and in addition, due to the ethnic violence that took place in Darfur, a 
humanitarian crisis on a regional scale emerged.149 The planned deploying 
of the EU-led forces was postponed because the circumstances on the 
ground did not permit, i.e. because the violence in the country had escalated 
as a consequence of attacks by the armed opposition against the 
governmental forces in the Chadian capital N´Djamena.150 The authorities 
of Chad and Central-African Republic gave their consent to the deploying of 
the EU-led forces while the leaders of the Chad armed opposition jointly 
questioned the impartiality of the EU military operation and advocated the 
EU countries to “refrain from sending their troops to serve within the 
framework of the EUFOR”.151 Later in June 2008, when the deploying was 
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completed, EU-led forces consisting of Irish troops designed to protect 
internally displaced persons and refugee camps were attacked and fired 
upon, and the EU-led forces returned the fire.152 Two months later in August 
2008 a EUFOR patrol was fired upon more than once by “an unidentified 
armed group” and returned the fire.153 As a consequence of hostile fire in a 
cross border incident a EU military operation had its first fatality when a 
French soldier lost his life in a deadly attack in operation EUFOR 
Tchad/RCA.154   
4.4.1  Party to the conflict  
It is the party to an armed conflict who must respect its obligations under 
IHL. By virtue of the stating “each party to the conflict” in common Art. 3 
in the Geneva Conventions it has been recognized that one of the parties to a 
non-internationally armed conflict can be a non-state actor.155 Non-state 
actor or non-state armed group is often called “insurgents” or “rebels”. 
Similarly as these groups can be regarded as a party to an armed conflict, 
international organisations should be able to be regarded as a party to an 
armed conflict. It could be considered that the EU as an international 
organisation even has a stronger argument to be regarded as a party to a 
conflict since the EU, in contrary to many non-state armed groups, has 
international legal personality.156  
 
The degree of organisation is usually a significant element to decide if a 
non-state actor has the capacity to become “a party to a conflict”. The party 
involved in the conflict must have a certain level of organisation to be able 
to implement IHL rules, as the rules in common Art. 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions.157  
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One consequence of the EU´s international legal personality is that the EU 
could be considered a party to an armed conflict, without that its member 
states have to be considered as a party to that conflict.158  
 
According to the April 2002 Salamanca Presidency Declaration, “Respect 
for International Humanitarian Law is relevant in EU-led operations when 
the situation they are operating in constitutes an armed conflict to which the 
forces are party”,159 hence the EU recognized that IHL applies if EU-led 
forces become a party to the conflict, and thus also recognized that EU-led 
forces can become a party to a conflict.160  
 
If acknowledged that a EU military operation can qualify as a party to an 
armed conflict, the fact that an EU military operation is composed of forces 
made available to the EU by member states and non-member states raises 
the question about who should be regarded as a party in the event of an 
armed conflict, the EU or the troop participating States.161 Also, but not 
further examined here, it is important to determine who is the party to a 
conflict in order to identify who is responsible for wrongful acts committed 
by a EU military operation.162   
 
The IHL instruments do not provide any pure answer to the question if it is 
the EU or the troop participating states that in the event of an armed conflict 
should be regarded as a party to the conflict.163 A thorough examination of 
this question relates to different fields of international law164 why the 
limited scope of this thesis exclude such an examination. However in order 
to provide some perspective on the issue, two aspects involved are briefly 
illustrated. A EU military operation is lead by the EU Operation 
Commander under the strategic guidance and direction of the Political and 
Security Committee.165 Via a transfer of authority from the participating 
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states, the EU Operation Commander usually receives operation control 
over the troops put at his/her disposal166 and when national authorities 
transfer such an authority, the states are in principle no longer allowed to 
give their forces operation directions.167 On the other hand, according to the 
April 2002 Salamanca Presidency Declaration, the obligation to respect IHL 
seems foremost to be an obligation for the participating states168 since the 
Salamanca Presidency Declaration stipulates “the responsibility for 
complying with IHL, in cases where it applies, in a European Union-led 
operation, rests primarily with the State to which the troops belong.”169 
Accordingly indicating that EU member states believe that it should be 
them, and not the EU, that should be considered as a party to an armed 
conflict.170 
4.5   Conclusions 
The examination in this chapter verifies that a consideration of IHL as 
applicable law to the EU is not premature. The examination has illustrated 
that even if EU military operations themselves have not yet been involved in 
an armed conflict, operations have been deployed in areas with ongoing 
armed conflicts between other actors and in situations where deadly combat 
has been used. It must be an accurate belief that the EU does not desire a 
situation of armed conflict, but it is not for the EU to decide if an armed 
conflict is occurring or not, it is determined by the actual situation on the 
ground. Albeit the EU lacks the intention to enter an armed conflict, EU 
military operations might nevertheless be fired and attacked upon to a level 
for the situation to reach an armed conflict. This is especially true when an 
operation is performed under a Chapter VII mandate and the EU operation is 
performed in a hostile and unpredictable environment and involves tasks of 
compound security issues, for example as in EUFOR TCHAD/RCA. Hence 
the likelihood for EU military operations to become involved in an armed 
conflict cannot be ignored and EU military operation may at one-day find 
themselves engaged in an armed conflict.  
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4.5.1   International Humanitarian Law as        
applicable law 
By virtue of the explicit reference in Art. 47 TEU to the legal personality of 
the EU, acknowledge to include international legal personality, the EU is 
able to possess obligations under international law. Meaning that the EU 
would be bound by agreements it concludes which encompass IHL 
obligations, thus the EU could in theory become a party to IHL treaties. 
However as shown in this chapter, the current IHL treaties are designed to 
exclude such a construction as the EU since they are only open for 
ratification by states. With its new acquired role as a military actor and its 
peculiarities as an international organisation, the EU displays holes within 
the IHL scope and validates that when a non-state entity enter the IHL treaty 
realm the fairly old assumption that merely states are subjects of 
international law contains weaknesses.   
 
On the contrary to the EU as such all EU member states are parties to the 
Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols. What is often 
forgotten, but exemplified in this chapter, is that non-member states are also 
participating in EU military operations and this leads de facto to a less 
uniform IHL-treaty framework between EU-led forces. It leads to concern 
that one of the most frequent participating non-member states, Turkey, has 
not signed, nor ratified the two Additional Protocols. Additionally, also EU 
member states contribute to make the IHL-treaty framework less uniform 
since divergences are also occurring among member states with regards to 
the ratification of numerous IHL treaties (who’s customary nature has not 
been recognised). The legal dissonance could affect the unity and 
effectiveness of a military operation on the ground, even more, it could lead 
to the contradictive situation where behaviour of EU military operations 
could violate IHL depending of the nationality of the forces. Could the 
discrepancy in a uniform IHL-treaty framework be solved with the help of 
customary law?  
 
It has been acknowledged in jurisprudence that customary international law 
applies to the EU (the European Court of Justice explicitly declared in the 
case Air Transport Association of America that the EU is bound to observe 
international law in its entirety including customary international law).  
With regard to the principle of functionality illustrated in this chapter, the 
author posits that the EU as an international organisation has to obey 
customary IHL when it undertakes activities in the field where IHL is 
relevant. Meaning that the EU as an international organisation need to have 
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the possibility and capability to commence military action that could resort 
to an armed conflict. This leads the author to conclude, on account of the 
conclusions in chapter 3 (particular the task-catalogue in Art. 43 TEU and 
the EUs operational capability) and due to the illustration of the commenced 
and launched military operations that the EU has the capacity to be bound 
by customary IHL.  
 
4.5.2   Party to the conflict and the question of   
responsibility  
According to the April 2002 Salamanca Presidency Declaration “Respect 
for International Humanitarian Law is relevant in EU-led operations when 
the situation they are operating in constitutes an armed conflict to which the 
forces are party”, hence it appears that the EU has recognized that IHL 
applies if EU-led forces become engaged in a situation of armed conflict and 
by that also accepts that EU-led forces can become “a party” to an armed 
conflict.  
 
The author implies that the EU as an international organisation has the 
necessary degree of organisation and structure to be considered “a party” to 
an armed conflict. This is based on the conclusions in chapter three, which 
declared that the EU has a substantial legal framework, with a structured 
planning and decision-making process, governed by the EU Treaty. 
Moreover, as concluded in chapter three and further deliberated here, the 
fact that the operational control and/or command over the EU-led forces are 
in the hands of the EU Operation Commander during an operation, and the 
fact that the Political and Security Committee exercises the political control 
and strategic direction, under the responsibility of the Council, of EU 
military operation proves that the EU has a sufficient level of organisation 
and a chain of command.   
 
After showing that the EU in principal can be considered as a party to a 
conflict the question of weather, in the event of an armed conflict, the EU or 
the participating states should be considered as a party to the conflict arises. 
The often referred to Salamanca Presidency Declaration points towards the 
participating states by stating “the responsibility for complying with IHL, in 
cases where it applies, in a European Union-led operation, rests primarily 
with the State to which the troops belong”. Noteworthy is however that the 
Salamanca Declaration was adopted in 2002 before the EU had required, 
and started use, its military operational capability. Hence, perhaps during 
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the time of adoption the rapid development of military operations and the 
issue regarding attribution of responsibility was not foreseen. Moreover the 
Salamanca Declaration was adopted before it was explicitly confirmed that 
the EU had legal personality and could thus possess rights and obligations 
under international law, why perhaps member states, because of the lack of 
other options, had to be consider as the right actors to possess obligations 
under IHL. As analysed in chapter three and further deliberated above, 
albeit the intergovernmental nature of EU military operations, the point of 
departure in practice must be that the EU exercise control over a military 
operation. Seeing that the EU, via the Council and the Political and Security 
Committee are exercising political control and strategic direction for a 
military operation. And since the operational control of EU military 
operations, via the transfer of authority from participating states, during the 
operation itself is in the hands of the EU Operation Commander. To have 
operation control and/or command must be understood to de facto control 
the conduct of the EU-forces in the field. Thus a significant degree of 
authority over the forces is assigned to the EU during EU military 
operations. Subsequently, it is difficult for the author to accept that the EU 
would be free from responsibility for the conduct of a military operation. 
Even if is not accepted that the EU primarily should be regarded as the party 
to a conflict and thus obtain obligations under IHL, it should, by dint of the 
analysis above, at least be sufficient enough to argue that the EU cannot 
avoid responsibility. 
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5   The role of International     
Humanitarian Law in the 
EU´s internal legal order 
The previous chapter described that if a EU military operation becomes 
involved as a party to an armed conflict, IHL will apply by customary law. 
Nevertheless not all IHL obligations are accepted as customary law and 
customary law might prove to be of abstract guidance and provide penurious 
operation directions to the EU-led forces on the ground. To the extent the 
EU in its legal order has incorporated the relevant legal standards of IHL 
EU military operations might in principle be bound by IHL not only by 
customary law but also by EU law. Therefore it could be of value to 
examine the EU´s internal legal order with the aim to search for IHL 
obligations complementary to customary law. Hence this chapter 
investigates if, and to what degree, the EU has integrated IHL into its own 
legal order. Soft law instruments adopted by the EU in the realm of IHL are 
also examined, even their non-binding character they might be valuable in 
clarify the EU´s approach to IHL.  
5.1   The EU Treaty and International  
Humanitarian Law 
A first generally IHL oriented examination of the TEU gives a gentle result. 
The TEU do not explicitly mention IHL. During the negotiations of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) made an effort to convince the member states to refer to IHL in the 
foreign and security section of the Treaty but the member states did not 
then, or any time thereafter, follow the recommendation.171 The lack of clear 
references to IHL does not automatically have to lead to the conclusion that 
IHL have no place in the EU´s legal order.172 Indeed, IHL principles might 
implicitly be found in the TEU.173  
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It has been argued that IHL obligations might derive via a wide 
understanding of the EU´s internal obligation to respect human rights.174  
IHL obligations have also been suggested to mainstream into EU´s internal 
order via human rights through general principles of EU law.175  
 
General principles of IHL, such as impartiality, neutrality and non-
discrimination are mentioned in Art. 214 (2) TFEU, which relates to the 
EU´s humanitarian aid policy. Art. 214 (2) states “humanitarian aid 
operations shall be conducted in compliance with the principles of 
international law and with the principles of impartiality, neutrality and non-
discrimination”. This provision has been argued to serve as an indication for 
the actual incorporation of IHL into EU´s legal order.176  
5.1.1   Article 6 (3) TEU 
Art. 6 (3) has been said to contain legal grounds for the incorporation of 
IHL into EU´s legal order. Art. 6 (3) TEU stipulates “Fundamental rights, as 
guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional 
traditions common to the member states, shall constitute general principles 
of the Union´s law”. At first glance this article seems to dismiss IHL and 
simply refer to human rights, especially those in the European Convention 
of Human Rights (ECHR) and those which results from the constitutional 
traditions of the EU member states. Arguably human rights are usually 
understood as a separate branch of international law from IHL.177 On the 
other hand IHL might be considered as a special subset of human rights and 
thus if accepted, IHL obligations can derive from the realm of Art. 6 (3).178  
 
Another possible way of interpret IHL obligations by way of Art. 6 (3) is via 
the phrase “fundamental rights”. Fundamental rights most not unconsciously 
be understood as merely human rights but possible also IHL, if human rights 
are acknowledge as fundamental rights the same could be hold for IHL.179 
The element “the constitutional traditions common to the Member States” 
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are also proposed to include IHL. The main IHL treaties have been 
extensive ratified by the EU member states and thus numerous IHL 
obligations are shared by and are common to the EU member states.180 And 
moreover, as a source of inspiration and guidance for identifying general 
principles of EU law the European Court of Justice has referred to the  
“international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the 
Member States have collaborated or of which they are signatories”.181 Due 
to the fact that all EU member states are parties to the Geneva Conventions 
and their Additional Protocols it has been claimed by a analogy 
interpretation that IHL treaties, likewise as human rights treaties, can be 
certain essential sources of inspiration for the establishment of “general 
principles of Union law” as stated in Art. 6 (3).182  
5.1.2   Articles 21 and 3 (5) TEU 
The Treaty of Lisbon is the first EU-treaty in history which makes a 
reference regarding the relationship between international law and the 
EU.183 Art. 21 (1) TEU advocates the objectives of the EU external action 
and express “The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided 
by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and 
enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, 
the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality 
and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter 
and international law.” The expressing “international law“ is claimed to 
include IHL184 and therefore it has been stated that this article might provide 
an incorporation of IHL into the EU legal order.185  
 
International law is also referred to in Art. 3 (5) TEU. According to this 
article the EU shall in its relations with the wider world “contribute…to the 
strict observance and the development of international law”. However 
neither Art. 21 (1) TEU nor Art 3 (5) TEU provide any expression to 
enforce direct obligations to the EU, on the contrary these articles seems to 
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be of a programmatic character.186 Nevertheless Art. 21 (3) TEU further 
states, “The Union shall respect the principles and pursue the objectives set 
out in in paragraphs 1 and 2 in the development and implementation of 
different areas of the Unions external action”. Thus in comparison to Art. 3 
(5) TEU the wording in Art. 21 TEU is more far reaching and indicate an 
obligation for the EU to respect international law, and hence IHL.187 Further 
it has been claimed that Art. 21 (1) TEU has to impose obligations on the 
EU since it would be wrongful to consider that this article would have no 
legal substantive consequence for the EU and its member states, due to the 
articles binding nature as a constitutional objective of EU law.188 On the 
other hand, the European Court of Justice in the Grand Chamber in the case 
Air Transport Association of America referred to Art. 3 (5) TEU when they 
found that the European Union is bound to observe international law in its 
entirety, including customary international law.189  
5.2   The legal basis of EU military  
operations and International 
Humanitarian Law  
As described in chapter three, a EU military operation is governed by a 
Council decision. A Council decision is normally not addressing IHL or 
including any reference to IHL obligations.190 A Status of Forces Agreement 
established between the EU and the host State, and/or a participating 
agreement concluded with another participating state in a EU military 
operation, are a part of the legal basis of a EU military operation and the EU 
has the possibility to include an obligation to be bound by IHL in these 
agreements. However the EU do normally include any reference to IHL in 
these legal acts.191 A clear example in this regard is the participating 
agreement with Turkey who as described, is not a party to the two 
Additional Protocols of 1977, but nevertheless no reference is made to IHL 
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in the participating agreement.192 A partial exception is operation EUFOR 
RD Congo where the Status of Forces Agreement concluded between the 
UN and the Democratic Republic of Congo referred to IHL and applied to 
the EU-led forces because of UN Security Resolution 1671.193 
5.3  EU soft law and International 
Humanitarian Law  
The EU has agreed on a number of soft law instruments relating to IHL. An 
essential instrument in this regard is the EU Guidelines on Promoting 
Compliance with IHL,194 which has been adopted by the Council.195 The 
Guidelines have been considered to offer a valuable outline of the EU´s 
approach to IHL and to be the most far-reaching IHL instrument adopted by 
the EU.196 The purpose of the Guidelines is to set out operational tools for 
the EU and its institutions and bodies to promote compliance with IHL.197 
For example paragraph 3 of the Guidelines states “The European Union is 
founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. This includes the goal of 
promoting compliance with IHL”. Thus the Guidelines accept that the goal 
of promoting compliance with IHL is one of the founding principles of the 
EU.198 However the Guidelines aims to address compliance with IHL by 
third states, as paragraph 2 of the Guidelines states “these Guidelines are in 
line with the commitment of the EU and its Member States to IHL, and aim 
to address compliance with IHL by third States, and, as appropriate, non-
State actors operating in third States. Whilst the same commitment extends 
to measures taken by the EU and its Member States to ensure compliance 
with IHL in their own conduct, including by their own forces, such 
measures are not covered by these Guidelines”. Hence the Guidelines do not 
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contain any obligation for the EU and its member states to comply with 
IHL, on the contrary it primarily promote compliance with IHL amongst 
third states.199 Nevertheless it has been argued that this reading should not 
be underestimated since it acknowledges the EU´s role as a military actor 
with the capability to undertake IHL obligations.200    
 
Three additionally instruments concerning the conduct of the EU-led troops 
are of primary interest for IHL obligations. The 2008 EU Guidelines on 
Children in Armed Conflict explicitly refers to IHL as a source guiding the 
EU in its activity to ensure protection of children affected by an armed 
conflict, and moreover mention a list of relevant IHL treaties.201 Further the 
EU Draft Guidelines on Protection of Civilians in EU-led Crisis 
Management Operations are aimed to guarantee protection of civilians in 
EU military operations, for example Art. 7 stipulates “bearing in mind their 
obligations under national and international law, States contributing 
personnel deployed in EU-led crisis management operations should in 
particular ensure monitoring and reporting of alleged violations of human 
rights, international humanitarian or international criminal law”.202 Though 
these Guidelines have not been adopted by the Council why the value of the 
Guidelines is trivial.203 The Generic Standards of Behavior for the ESDP 
operations204 was developed after a request from the Political and Security 
Committee and is a document on standards of behavior to be used in the 
planning for future common security and defence operations.205 According 
to paragraph 4 “The standards of behavior are complementary to the legal 
obligations of personnel. Personnel must apply the provisions of 
international law, including, when applicable, the law of armed conflict, and 
the laws of the contributing state.” The Standards have been claimed to be 
valuable because they at EU level express fundamental principles of IHL 
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regarding for example the distribution of IHL around EU-led forces and the 
duty to prosecute alleged violations of IHL committed by EU-led forces.206 
  
Nevertheless the instruments mentioned above are all of a non-legally 
binding character, why the legal values of them are highly uncertain.207  
5.4   Conclusions  
As described in this chapter the constitutional instruments of the EU do not 
include any explicit reference to IHL. However, several submissions for an 
indirect incorporation of IHL into EU´s legal order have been illustrated.  
 
In contrary to IHL, the TEU refers to human rights. The question is if 
human rights can be recognized to include IHL. The close relationship 
between IHL and human rights law in an armed conflict speaks affirmative 
for such a connection. On the other hand, IHL is a legal regime of its own 
and the EU could potentially be criticized if it thinks of IHL as a subgroup 
of human rights, instead of acknowledge IHL´s own existence. If accepted 
that IHL within the EU´s legal order can be considered as a subgroup of 
human rights law IHL will consequently be included in the realm of Art. 6 
(3) TEU and thus the EU´s legal order contain an obligation for the EU to 
respect IHL.  
 
There is also another way to interpret IHL in EU´s constitutional order via 
Art. 6 (3) TEU. Even if precluded that IHL is a subgroup of human rights, 
the element “fundamental freedoms” could potentially include IHL, since 
this reading explicitly not merely refer to human rights. Moreover, the 
Geneva Conventions and the two Additional Protocols have been ratified by 
the EU member states, hence numerous IHL rules are de facto shared by the 
member states as they are included in both the member states national and 
treaty legislations and could therefore be considered to be a part of the 
“constitutional traditions common to the Member States” in Art. 6 (3) TEU. 
And further, if the criteria “general principles of the Union´s law” is 
accepted to include IHL, by the fact that the Geneva Conventions and their 
Additional Protocol are ratified by all member states and therefore, similar 
to “international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the 
Member States have collaborated or of which they are signatories” could 
serve as a source of guidance to pinpoint general principles of Union law, 
the EU would be bound by IHL by way of EU law.  
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Art. 3 (5) TEU stipulate that in relation with the wider world “the EU shall 
contribute to the strict observance and the development of international 
law”. This wording can give different result depending on the way of 
interpretation. With a narrow reading of “shall contribute” the article seems 
to merely include a sort of goal for the EU in its engagements as a military 
actor. However, in the case of Air Transport Association of America the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) based its finding, that the EU is bound to 
observe international law in its entirety, on Art. 3 (5) TEU and hence the 
ECJ seems to believe that Art. 3 (5) can enforce a substantive obligation on 
the EU. If Art. 3 (5) TEU is read together with Art. 21 (1) and (3) TEU 
which provides that the EU shall respect international law in its external 
action, it could be argued that these provisions are not merely stipulating 
that the EU´s role in its external actions are based on international law, they 
could be claimed to acknowledge that international law, and hence 
international humanitarian law, impose certain boundaries on the EU when 
it acts as a military actor on the international scene.  
 
The examination has disclosed that there is no custom behavior for the EU 
to include IHL obligations in the legal basis for its military operations. In 
the described exception it was the UN who refereed to IHL in a SOFA that 
was extended to a EU military operation. With regard to the non-member 
state Turkey, bearing in mind that Turkey has not ratified the two Additional 
Protocols, it could be considered odd not to include such a reference in the 
participating agreement governing Turkeys involvement in the EU military 
operation. For the benefit of a uniform IHL framework, that is something 
the EU should consider to change in future agreements.    
 
This chapter also examined EU soft law instrument. The soft law 
instruments served its purpose (regardless their non-legal binding character) 
to clarify the EU´s attitude against IHL. The instruments demonstrates 
awareness from the EU as regard IHL, but also a caution to make IHL 
obligations legally binding. The EU Guidelines on Promoting Compliance 
with IHL are adopted by the Council and has in this since the highest value 
of the instruments refereed too. However the Guidelines do not create any 
obligation for the EU, but for the clarification of the EU´s attitude against 
IHL they are valuable as they clearly state that the IHL guidelines are in line 
with the commitment of the EU and its member states to IHL, thus illustrate 
to some extent that the EU have a will to comply with IHL. But due to the 
rather general nature of the Guidelines it is too far-reaching to state that they 
can create any obligation for the EU. The other mentioned IHL soft law 
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instruments appears to work as a kind of internal instructions for the 
behavior of the EU-led troops on the ground. However due to their non-
binding character, they do not create any IHL obligations for the EU and the 
level of compliance is uncertain. 
 
In summary, with some interpretation it can be understood that Art. 3 (5), 
Art. 21 and Art. 6 (3) TEU indirectly contains obligations for the EU to 
respect IHL, especially with regard to the latter. Due to the relatively close 
link between IHL and human rights and the fact that the EU is bound by 
human rights law and due to the ratification by EU member states of the 
main IHL treaties, it could be argued that IHL, similar to human rights law, 
have reached the status of “general principles of EU law”, as this is 
expressed in Art. 6 (3) TEU.  
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6   Concluding remarks  
The purpose of the thesis was to examine how the legal framework of EU 
military operations, with focus on IHL, can apply to EU military operations. 
The thesis has portrayed that the EU as a relatively new military actor has 
conducted several military operations in third countries with troops put at its 
disposal by EU member states and non-member states. The rapid 
development of EU military operations makes it essential to examine the 
law governing EU´s activities within its Common Security and Defence 
Policy. As the legal framework of EU´s military operations stands today it 
provides sufficient and substantial tools for the launch and deployment of a 
wide range of different EU military operations. However the maturity test 
for the legal framework will occur when the EU launch, or when an 
operation develops into, a more complex military operation in higher risk 
theatre possible involving combat of armed conflict. Thus challenges for the 
legal framework might arise in the future, particularly related to the 
relationship between the EU and IHL in the event of an armed conflict.  
 
The thesis has concluded that the EU as an international organisation is a 
capable military actor, with a permanent military structure and a confirmed 
operational capability to undertake peace-making operations in conflict 
situations (with a possible link to peace enforcement in Art.43 TEU). 
Practice of commenced operation has illustrated that the likelihood for a EU 
military operation to become engaged in an armed conflict cannot be 
ignored. This leads the author to submit that it is vital to clarify if and how 
IHL could apply to the conduct of EU military operations. The thesis has 
established that the EU has international legal personality opposed of its 
member states. As a result of its legal personality the EU has rights and 
obligations under IHL, a treaty-making capacity and a possibility to 
conclude binding decisions. The EU is a subject of IHL because it has 
international legal personality. 
 
It is an undisputable fact that current IHL treaties are not open for 
ratification for such a construction as the EU. The thesis has concluded that 
to a certain extent, diverse legal standards of IHL-treaty obligations exist 
among participating states within EU military operations. However, a 
substantial part of international humanitarian law qualifies as customary 
international law and could thus limit the affect of diverse legal obligations.  
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International customary law is the most significant source of IHL 
obligations for the EU as an international organisation with multinational 
troops engaged in military operations. As an international organisation the 
EU is bound by customary IHL when it undertake activities in the field in 
which IHL is relevant, inter alia a situation of armed conflict. Nevertheless 
not all IHL obligations are considered as customary law and customary law 
could be of abstract guidance to the EU-led forces on the ground. 
 
The EU´s internal legal order could possibly clarify and complement IHL 
customary law. However, contrary to human rights law, the TEU does not 
include any explicit reference to IHL. Nevertheless, this paper has shown 
that IHL could potentially stream into the EU´s legal order by way of human 
rights law and/or via a possible interpretation of Arts. 6 (3), 3 (5) and 21 
TEU to include IHL. Especially, with regard to the EU member states 
ratification of the main IHL treaties, and the close link between IHL and 
human rights law and the fact that EU is bound by human rights law, IHL 
could be argued to have reach the status of “general principles of EU law” 
as this is expressed in Art 6 (3) TEU. If accepted, the EU would be bound 
by IHL not merely by customary law but also by EU law. However the 
uncertainty in this regard provide minor help with regard to clarify IHL 
obligations for the troops on the ground.  
 
The EU risks jeopardizing its credibility as an international organisation 
with multinational troops engaged in military operations by not regulating 
the conduct of its troops under IHL. As the EU stands today, with both 
intergovernmental and supranational elements, it is too far-reaching to argue 
that the EU could be considered a state in the sense of the IHL-treaty realm. 
Therefore, the EU could at most be bound by IHL by way of customary law 
in the field in which they undertake activities. The EU´s internal order could 
merely with some interpretation be considered to include some IHL 
obligations. The EU´s future accession to the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) could conceivably instigate a crucial change in the 
relationship between the EU´s legal order and IHL since the ECtHR in 
principle could interpret IHL as a way of human rights law and thus stream 
IHL into the EU´s legal order. However, the EU can already today be 
considered to possess the main command and control over EU military 
operations due to the fact that the EU exercises political control, strategic 
direction, operational command, and/or control over EU military operations. 
Due to this, it becomes vital to further clarify the relationship between the 
EU as an international organisation and IHL as a legal regime. Evidently, 
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this is also important for attributing responsibility for a possible violation of 
IHL.  
 
Hence, the author gives the following recommendations for the future: 
 
It is recommended that the EU and its member states further acknowledge 
the fact that the EU has explicit international legal personality and therefore 
possesses rights and obligations under the EU´s Common Security and 
Defence Policy and under IHL. The EU has to uphold its credibility as an 
international organisation and cannot merely entrust the implementation of 
its Common Security and Defence Policy to its member states and other 
third states, without regulating the conduct of the EU-led forces under IHL.  
 
The EU could make self-regulatory acts and unilaterally bind itself to 
respect IHL, for example by making the “EU Guidelines on Promoting 
Compliance with IHL” binding on the conduct of EU military operations. It 
hampers the credibility of the EU to encourage other actors to comply with 
IHL without acknowledging that it should also do this itself.  
 
It is recommendable that IHL is taken into account in the planning phrase of 
a EU military operation. The EU could use the possibility to include a 
reference obliging compliance with IHL in a Status of Forces Agreement or 
participating agreement, and thus be bound by IHL obligations by way of 
treaty law. If no reference to IHL is included in a Operation Plan or Rules of 
Procedure, the author hopes that these documents are elastic enough to 
embrace a possible change of condition (if the EU-led forces on the ground 
suddenly are in risk to become involved in a armed conflict) as regards the 
applicability of IHL. This could be achieved by giving the EU Operation 
Commander the authority to amend the Rules of Procedure.  
 
The EU should clarify the division of command and control between the EU 
and the participating states in military operations. By doing this, the EU 
would also provide clarification with regard to the question of 
responsibility. As a suggestion, the Council could make an official 
acknowledgment in a decision when launching a military operation 
regarding who is responsible for the conduct of the operation. An 
acknowledgement of the Council that the conduct of the EU military 
operation is attributable to the EU would echo to the international 
community that the EU accepts that its conduct as a military actor and 
engagement in international security creates an obligation for it to act in a 
liable manner. 
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With its unclear and unique nature as an organisation the EU challenges the 
IHL-realm. A clear position from the EU concerning the relationship 
between its conduct as a military actor and IHL would enhance the EU´s 
credibility and hopefully contribute to develop the legal regime of IHL.  
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